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The value of reciprocity is often promoted through contemporary policy-making. In contrast, political philosophers, through developing critiques of the Rawlsian conception of justice as reciprocity, have often argued against such a principle forming a basis for legitimating policies. This paper also offers a critique of contemporary policy-making but using a re-cast form of the Rawlsian justification of reciprocity. My main argument is that the Rawlsian premise of ‘sharing’ fates is too weak (by itself) to underpin reciprocity. However, reciprocity might be more securely based on the premise of learning from each other’s fates, given the diversity of individual experiences.
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Introduction – the policy context and the principle of reciprocity

Risking oversimplification, internationally the New Right policy reforms of the eighties and early nineties has been largely superseded by a second raft of policies that have been initiated by Centre-Left governments. Nevertheless, despite turns in political fortunes, it has often been observed that one of the main principles common to both sets of reforms has been the stress on establishing reciprocal relationships between the state and the individual, particularly in relation to welfare policy.​[1]​ This emphasis has led, for example, to establishing government responsibilities and obligations to pay state welfare benefits or provide particular services, but only when conditions are fulfilled relating to the recipient’s behaviour and/or status.​[2]​ Therefore, Clintonite and Blairite policies have implemented social security legislation so that once a claimant shows willing to conform to certain pre-conditions to, say, seek work or training, then the state is obliged to support these individuals. This support is given in such a way that, as much as possible, provides a route out of so-called ‘welfare dependency’ into ‘financial independence’.​[3]​ However, within these policies the option of remaining on benefit without taking-up offers of work or training has become increasingly difficult for those claimants considered ‘able’. So a conditional reciprocal relationship is set-up by government which is intended to shape the behaviour of certain individuals in relation to the state.

In addition, there have been more systematic attempts at giving flesh to these ideas through various writers and commentators sympathetic to the Centre-Left cause. First, the emphasis within reciprocity, on mutual obligation and responsibility between the state and individual, has been used to force a wedge between this new ‘tough’ Centre-Leftism and what is seen as the old ‘soft’ (i.e. less conditional) welfarism of the more immediate post-war era.​[4]​ Second, reciprocity has also been used to highlight differences between the ‘market dogmatism’ of the New Right (emphasising competition and ‘monadic individualism’) and the Centre-Left’s more pragmatic approach to the market (emphasising notions such as ‘the stakeholder society’ and ‘the moral community’).​[5]​ The concept of reciprocity in both of these contexts has become a device to stress what is understood as the excesses of past left and right policy programmes. 


Critiques of reciprocity within political philosophy

Despite the above trends in policy development and its justification, justice as reciprocity has been severely criticised from a wide variety of philosophical quarters. In this section I will outline some of the main critiques as a prelude to a defence of the principle of reciprocity, but a defence that is also critical of the above Centre-Left justifications of policy. 

First, there are those who argue that reciprocity is incoherent as a principle informing policy development as it is at ‘ground level’ indeterminate or insubstantial. Arneson (1997), for example, argues that the principle of reciprocity as related to justice is clearly wrong if it refers to the returning of equivalent benefits.​[6]​ Amongst other things, this will result in the better off always receiving much larger benefits than the worst off because the former ‘return rate’ will tend to be higher than the latter. For example, the better off will make often make higher contributions through taxation than the worst off which under this conception of reciprocity would need to be compensated. Alternatively, other problems arise if reciprocity instead refers to mutual cost as large costs might be incurred for particular individuals but for relatively little benefit received by others. For example, again in relation to taxation the worst off might experience the cost of paying tax much more acutely than the better off, even if the latter is making much higher financial contributions. 

For Arneson, the only credible meaning of reciprocity is one that refers to the disposition of persons. This concept of reciprocity captures what might be understood as an appropriate attitude to fair and just relations and is expressed in the dictum: ‘if you do me a favour I am obliged to return a similar favour in similar circumstances’.​[7]​ However, this conception, although seems to factor out problems associated with equivalence and cost highlighted above as it includes similar circumstances, for Arneson exposes the indeterminancy of reciprocity, as any amount of policies can be argued for within this latter conception. Most notably these include polices that are usually rejected by the above Centre-Left policy-makers and commentators who are seeking to defend some notion of justice as reciprocity. For example, it would allow for able-bodied people to be wilfully unemployed and in receipt of benefits as long as they are disposed to helping others in the same position and in the same circumstances at some future date. 

Scanlon (1998), taking a different tack, has also sought to highlight the insubstantial nature of reciprocity as a foundational normative commitment.​[8]​ For example, the principle of reciprocity is not undermined if both parties agree to break promises, yet for Scanlon this agreement should still be understood as immoral.​[9]​ There are a various reasons for this moral offence that are mainly based on the value of providing assurances between both parties that allow for planned behaviour.​[10]​ Providing such assurances would rule out the possibility of stating ‘this is my present intention, but of course I might change my mind’ even if there is a reciprocal agreement that would permit this. For Scanlon, the point is that promise-keeping as a value commitment can be accounted for through contractual terms. There ought to be mutually agreed duties not to mislead – but this does not require additional moral conventions (such as those based on reciprocal agreements) to underpin such commitments. Of course, this contractarian basis for decision-making is not uncommon as a justification for democratic policy-making, and (as highlighted above) has often been implied as part of the appeal to reciprocity found in New Centre-Left politics. For example, the idea of ‘stakeholding’ has been underpinned by the notion that there exists some kind of quasi-contract between the state and the individual but based on the principle of reciprocity.​[11]​ However, for Scanlon reciprocity as a moral principle (and by implication as a justification for policy) needs to be sidelined in order to make room for what is seen as a more substantial commitment to the values of trust, fidelity and contract-making.​[12]​

There is a second form of criticism of reciprocity that instead focuses on the problem of those who are defined as ‘radically unproductive’. For example, Cohen (1989),​[13]​ highlights how one important part of the Rawlsian position (simply put) is that given co-operation between the able and less able is in the main mutually advantageous, then the various personal assets and talents of individuals can be conceived of as being owned in common.​[14]​ Subsequently, justice as linked to reciprocity is understood as capturing the idea of ‘doing your fair share’ as part of a co-operative venture where everyone benefits, regardless of the amount of talent an individual might possess in relation to another.​[15]​ However, one of the main problems with this conception of justice, according to Cohen, is that those who cannot produce benefits of any kind (due, say, to severe disabilities), through no fault of their own, are unable to reciprocate.​[16]​ As a result, holding assets in common and the establishment of mutually advantageous relationships are antithetical in this context. This is because the principles of mutuality and reciprocity are undermined when the ‘common’ in common assets include those who are unable to reciprocate.​[17]​ For Cohen this difficulty highlights a basic incoherence at the heart of Rawls, as the contracturalist characterisation by Rawls of the problem of justice (emphasising mutuality and reciprocity) seems to be inconsistent with the Rawlsian principles of justice (emphasising common asset holding and the undeserved nature of talent possession).​[18]​ 

Barry (1995) also highlights the problem of those who are unable to reciprocate.​[19]​  First, he makes a distinction between ‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as reciprocity’.​[20]​ The main problem of defending justice as mutual advantage is that it can be reduced to merely reflecting the relative bargaining power of two or more parties. It may allow ‘advantages’ to the weaker party but only because the stronger can make threats to the weaker if they do not comply with conditions set by the stronger – therefore it becomes in the interest of the weaker to comply.​[21]​ Clearly, for most this would not reflect a proper conception of justice and yet does conform to the principle of mutual advantage. In recognition of this difficulty, ‘justice as reciprocity’ (although contains the idea of mutuality) introduces the notion of ‘fair play’ to try and ensure that this type of exploitation of the weak by the strong cannot take place. The problem for Barry is that reciprocity cannot in fact generate this fairness precisely because it does not take full account of the nature of weaknesses in many cases – i.e. certain groups of people are weak because they cannot reciprocate.​[22]​ 

The third type of criticism of justice as reciprocity focuses on the value of self-ownership. The objection is that a proper distinction has not been made by Rawls between the possession of talents and the individual exploitation of these talents.​[23]​ The appeal Rawls makes to the notion, that talents are effectively distributed as ‘manna from heaven’ without any special entitlement attached, is indefensible according to Nozick (1974), for example, as talents do come already attached to individual persons.​[24]​ In addition, even if everyone, including the most talented, benefit from social co-operation and that these talents are distributed as a matter of luck, this does not imply that the talented owe the fruits of their talents to the untalented.​[25]​ We may not deserve our talents but individuals can be perceived as responsible for the exploitation of these talents and therefore are justified and are entitled to the receipt of any subsequent reward or benefit. Of course, this exploitation may involve social co-operation but this does not imply that benefits after this act of co-operation ought to be shared. Reciprocal relationships could exist between the most and least talented, but there has been no additional voluntary contract to sanction such a re-distribution. In addition, the less talented would probably have already benefited from an act of co-operation with the more talented and so there is no justification for compensating the former any further.​[26]​ 

Finally, there is an objection to justice as reciprocity that is more conciliatory than those so far outlined. It concedes that the principle of reciprocity may have a genuine role in re-distributive justice but only as secondary to the principle of ensuring ‘real freedom’ for all (i.e. a universal freedom that is resource-based). According to Van Parijs (1995; 1997) and Van Der Veen (1998),​[27]​ this freedom would be established through providing a guaranteed Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) for everyone, with principles of reciprocity only operating after this initial re-distribution has taken place. The justification of providing this ‘real freedom for all’ is made on broadly two grounds. First, those who possess natural talents and jobs (both being in scarce supply) are lucky and should be taxed accordingly, thus funding the UBI.​[28]​ Second, that a state committed to UBI would be truly libertarian as it is establishing neutrality between conceptions of the good and, most notably, to those who choose a work-free ‘lazy’ lifestyle as distinct from a work-intense ‘crazy’ lifestyle.​[29]​ The argument in short is that, if reciprocity acts as a first principle (even in a highly revised form) this would undermine liberal neutrality and would not take proper account of the role of luck in the distribution of benefits and burdens within a capitalist society.​[30]​  


Defending justice as reciprocity – developing a counter-argument


First, I will argue that reciprocal relations incorporate two kinds of obligations based on a distinction that is often overlooked by political philosophers and policy-makers alike. There are obligations or responsibilities to return in some way benefits given by others, but also obligations and responsibilities to being open to receiving benefits from others. An oversight in relation to the latter is reinforced by the often overly-narrow conceptions (held by government policy makers especially) of what and how a person may be able to offer or contribute to another’s well-being. 

As explored above, commentators have highlighted the various problems associated with the notion that we have obligations and responsibilities to return in some way benefits produced by others. These problems are largely brought about by large differentials (a) in the possession of talents and the individual output of benefits, (b) in the costs of returning benefits received, and (c) that some people, in any event, do not have anything to contribute. In response to these types of critiques others, seeking to defend justice as reciprocity, have tried to argue for conceptions that do not depend on fixed definitions of equivalence in relation to output or cost. For example, White (1997) attempts to side-step the ‘differential talent/cost’ objection, by instead stressing the importance of returning benefits according to ability rather than some notion of ‘equivalency’ in relation to the benefit initially received.​[31]​ ‘From each according to his ability to each according to his need’ expresses this conception of reciprocity as does the less precise injunction that ‘everyone should do their bit’.​[32]​ This I believe is an important answer to the ‘differential talent/cost’ objections as White’s insistence that reciprocity must be sensitive to differentials in ability goes a long way to factor out the role of luck in the specific ability a person has to reciprocate. Nevertheless, it does not lose the idea that a person has a responsibility to reciprocate regardless of the large or small amount of talent that a particular person might possess. 

On one interpretation, White is re-articulating the Rawlsian position that, because we do not deserve our talents, moral principles other than ‘desert’ and ‘merit’ as directly related to talent possession must inform our judgements about what is fair and just.​[33]​ It is only at this point that the principle of reciprocity can get a proper hold based in large part on the assertion that acts of social co-operation are of benefit to all, irrespective of the level of talent that each person possesses. However, we have already seen that there appears to be a number of difficulties with this assertion as commentators from the egalitarian left, such as Barry (1995) and Cohen (1989), have highlighted.  Perhaps the most telling part of the objection, for Rawls’s and White’s position at least, is the highly contingent nature of the possibilities of reciprocity. Consequently, if we were to apply the principle of reciprocity we always seem left with the troubling question: ‘What about those people who cannot reciprocate at all?’ The intuitive egalitarian response to this question is that surely these people must be exempt from conditions of reciprocity. 

In reply to this, one answer might be that the condition ‘everyone should do their bit’ is fulfilled (counterfactually at least) by those who are not able to reciprocate, if it is assumed that they would do their bit had they the ability. However, whilst maybe saving the principle of reciprocity this rings hollow as it still leaves the practical application of the principle of reciprocity vulnerable, particularly if large groups of people at any one time are defined as unable to reciprocate. 

Some of my answer to the above difficulty would be to start fighting on a different front, and, as it were, by pincer movement surround the ‘opposition’ a little more. White’s argument could be left alone (i.e. as an important but incomplete response to the ‘differential talent/cost’ objection). Then it might be argued that a proper conception of reciprocity, as well as more explicitly promoting obligations to return benefits in some form to others (enter White), should also promote parallel obligations that individuals and institutions be much more open to receiving benefits from others. 

It seems a truism to claim that reciprocal relations are symbiotic or two-way. However, given this, then possibilities of reciprocity are blocked not only when individuals are unable or unwilling to return benefits but also when individuals are unable or unwilling to receive benefits from others. It is by recognising this latter ‘blocking process’, and dealing with it as such, that allows more possibilities for individuals (previously defined as non-contributors) to reciprocate. 


Widening the possibility of contribution – some philosophical and policy implications

My contention is that most (if not all) of the limitations to receiving benefits is a result of a lack of openness to the possibilities of receiving benefits rather than a fixed inability of ‘non-returners’ to produce returns. In addition, the limitations that receivers place on potential contributors lead to further obstacles to reciprocity (in the form of, for example, social and economic barriers to participation) for those groups defined as ‘non-reciprocators’. 

In relation to policy-making, both existing Centre-Left and previous New Right governments have been quick to condemn groups as welfare dependent and as ‘non-reciprocators’ because of their dependence on state resources. Nevertheless, as has often been pointed out, this does not necessarily take into account the positive contribution that many of these groups may already be making to the activities of the community in various forms.​[34]​ So, lone parents, the unemployed, elderly and disabled people are often already making significant contributions to the community that frequently go unrecognised, in large part because these groups have been pre-defined as dependent ‘non-reciprocators’. For example, it has been highlighted by feminist commentators in particular, that policy-makers have often ignored the contributions to the life of the community made through ‘reproductive labour’ (i.e. work related to the nurturing and caring of the next generation) often contributed by women.​[35]​ I have argued elsewhere that this oversight in turn results in certain categories of parents (such as lone parents) being socially constructed or defined either as dependent and ‘welfare scroungers’ or as dependent and ‘needy’. However, these definitions of lone parenthood do not take account of the possibility of defending payment of social security benefits to this group on the basis of ‘desert’ – i.e. lone parents deserve extra benefits because of the contribution that this group is making to the life of the community.​[36]​ The point here is that, whether the payment of social security benefits to this group is criticised (as implied by the former construction) or is justified (as implied by the latter constructions) the possibility of reciprocity is effectively ‘blocked’ by policy-makers when these groups are defined as ‘asymmetrically dependent’. 

A similar case can be made for other so-called dependent groups such as unemployed people, elderly and disabled people. For example, some policy commentators have argued that ‘contribution’ need not only be confined to activities involving paid work. Child-care has been dealt with in the above, but many other contributions are made to the life of the community outside of the narrow confines of waged labour that might include voluntary work, community-based group activities, cultural and artistic participation and the like.​[37]​ Clearly, these are already activities that unemployed, elderly and disabled people are often already engaged. 

Moreover, in relation to the latter group in particular I have also argued elsewhere that the way ‘talent’ is often defined by policy-makers and political philosophers alike mistakenly excludes the idea that disabled people can have and can develop talents. This process occurs not only despite their impairments, in certain important senses it is because of them.​[38]​ Those within the Disability Rights Movement (DRM) have often stressed how, for example, the experience of impairment can bring insights and levels of personal development that are not possible without having the condition. The problem for the DRM is that these gains from having a disability are not recognised by a society dominated by ‘disablist’ models of disability that tend to define the disabled person as ‘tragic’ and ‘deficient’ which further reinforces the misplaced assumption that disabled people are also unable to contribute.​[39]​ Similarly, political philosophers when focusing on disabled people as the ‘radically unproductive’ (see Cohen and Barry above) are conceding significant ground to those whom would place limitations on receiving various benefits and contributions from disabled people. In addition, these limitations are reinforced as the possibilities of reciprocity are narrowed for many disabled people whom, are not only defined as ‘non-reciprocators’, but also are excluded from full societal participation and integration. The ‘reality’ of non-reciprocation therefore becomes self-fulfilling by institutional and policy mechanisms that define disabled people as non-reciprocators and at the same time systematically exclude this group from fuller integration in societal activities. 


Learning from the fates of others as an act of ‘sharing’ – a reinterpretation of Rawls Part 1

The above re-framing of the way the condition of others are defined in relation to the possibilities of reciprocal relations, leads to a second set of arguments regarding the defence of justice as reciprocity. That reciprocity should emphasise not only the obligations of sharing the consequences of each other’s individual fates, relating to life chances, but also the obligation of learning from each other’s fates, relating to life insights. This mirrors the two-fold obligation explored above to both give and receive benefits from others. First, there are those obligations that might ensue from the fated nature of those defined as the ‘advantaged’ and ‘disadvantaged’ relating to unjust institutional arrangements. Second, there are those obligations based on learning from each other’s fates, and the experiences and insights that this might bring, as a result of having a particular ‘fated condition’. Most importantly, I will argue that these latter obligations will also allow for differences between individuals to be celebrated, in anticipation of the possibilities of increased reciprocity, even if existing social relations might unjustly reinforce the correlation between particular differences and particular advantages and disadvantages.

As highlighted above, Rawls (1971) defends his notion of ‘justice as fairness’ in a variety of ways, many of which focus on the moral implications of accepting two premises. 

A.	That having talents are undeserved, and 
B.	That mutual advantage is gained between the talented and the less talented when engaging in social co-operation.​[40]​ 

For Rawls this leads to an injunction that we must share each other’s fates and recognise the principle of reciprocity – whether particular fates are advantageous or disadvantageous to particular persons.​[41]​ Much of my argument so far has tried to address some of the problems raised by various critiques in relation to premise (b) by focusing on the overly-narrow way ‘mutual advantage’ is defined because of how diminished views of the possibilities of reciprocity are often viewed by these critiques. My intention now is to explore more closely premise (a) especially when faced with the libertarian objections explored above. However, to prepare the ground for this I will explore in more detail the injunction that we must share each other’s fate. 

The meaning of the verb ‘to share’ could encompass a wide variety of activities, including sharing what we have learnt. However, this analytical move I believe misses the point that the latter emphasis on learning is often lost in Rawlsian conceptions of sharing. He instead focuses on the problems of how decisions are made regarding just principles, given that particular fated conditions will undeservedly lead to inequalities of wealth, income and opportunity. As a result, the negative consequences of having fated conditions are assessed in relation to life-chances, the solution being to only decide upon principles of justice ignorant (amongst other things) of which fated condition is attached to whom. Consequently, knowing anything about particular fates are ruled out in decisions about what is just and fair, even when we do know that social co-operation leads to mutual advantage, and that particular fates are undeserved.​[42]​ 

However, crucially I also do not know what I might learn given my particular fated condition or what I might be taught through the fated conditions of others. Of course, Rawls might argue that the knowledge that we might learn from each fated condition might be permitted behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ provided this remains a ‘general fact’ without referring to conditions as being attached to particular individuals. However, this possibility does not seem to be emphasised by Rawls. Instead, the focus of attention for Rawls (and other liberal egalitarians explored above) is on how resources are re-distributed given the fated and unequal possession of talents. This is distinct from how particular unequal fated conditions are perceived (by the holder and others), conceived of as a basis for learning. Consequently, what Rawlsian positions become preoccupied with is showing that the ‘better off’ are not treated unfairly by such a re-distribution. Therefore, for Rawls although the basic structure of society should be designed to advance the interests of everyone so that:

“If A were not allowed his better position, B would be even worse off than he is … The difficulty is showing that A has no ground for complaint.”​[43]​

My argument is that one of the reasons for this difficulty is that Rawls does not explore the possibility of learning from each other’s fates including those fates that are typically correlated with particular social disadvantages. It might be, for example, that having certain conditions and experiences, whilst are associated with a range of unfair disadvantages that ought to be remedied accordingly, still nevertheless generate a range of personal skills and insights that would not be possible without having these conditions and experiences. Indeed, these skills and insights may often be taught most effectively from those who are defined as ‘disadvantaged’ in relation to their life chances. This is particularly given the specific contributions that can be made by these groups (explored above) borne out of the experience of caring for children, having an impairment, and more generally finding a contributory role outside of paid work. 

As already highlighted the problem for Nozick (1974) is that the Rawlsian case will always appear unconvincing given the value of self-ownership. What is at stake for Nozick is not the undeserved character of personal resources or the outcomes of social co-operation, but that the principle of self-ownership is being abused by Rawls as the advantaged are being used merely as a means to the ends of the disadvantaged. My contention is that this abuse of self-ownership could not occur, if the re-distribution of resources toward the disadvantaged is justified on the basis of reciprocity, and provided the ‘well-off’ are prepared to learn from the ‘worse-off’ in relation to the above skills and insights. Consequently, the principle of reciprocity is restored in the immediate sense, in part because the definition of ‘talent’ itself becomes much broader to incorporate those who are defined as ‘disadvantaged’ in certain contexts but not in others – i.e. disadvantaged in relation to life chances but not life insights.​[44]​ In other words, possibilities for learning are not defined by a one-dimensional set of criteria attached to fixed characteristics or conditions, but instead are developed through multi-dimensional and complex relational dynamics. Paralleling the objections to interpersonal comparisons of utility often discussed in the political philosophy literature,​[45]​ the claim here is that a simple interpersonal comparison between what is defined as ‘disadvantaged’ and ‘advantaged’ conditions as correlated with possibilities of learning, is at best an over-simplification of the relational dynamic to learning. At worst it is a plain misrepresentation that artificially denies the possibility of reciprocity to large groups of people defined as ‘disadvantaged’. 


Equality, citizenship, and interdependency - a reinterpretation of Rawls Part 2

The above emphasis on learning from the fates of others leads to my third argument in defence of justice as reciprocity. That the above form of reciprocity underpins a conception of equality and citizenship that can be found in Rawls, but is often underplayed. 

One of the main contributions made by Rawls to the liberal debate concerning justice was adding to the reciprocity principle of ‘doing one’s fair share’ (recognising mutually advantageous co-operative ventures), the principle of voluntarily agreeing to any re-distributive principles implied as a result.​[46]​ However, this agreement could only be made under conditions where it is impossible for individual vested interests to be served or promoted. The considerable ingenuity involved, by deriving from liberal contract theory principles of re-distribution, whilst has been universally recognised, has nevertheless been highly criticised. Some of these criticisms have been explored above, however, what remains is a criticism that in many ways goes to the core of this Rawslian liberal emphasis – namely, the emphasis that individuals choosing should form the basis for deciding upon just distributions. Nozick (1974), for example, explores how the principle of reciprocity, as described by Rawls, can stand diametrically opposed to choice-making. What if a person has not chosen to initiate or produce a particular benefit that might be received by that person, but has chosen not to make any contribution to the benefit being continued? Is this person acting justly or fairly even though in effect she has chosen not to reciprocate whilst receiving benefit from the efforts of others?​[47]​ The answer for Nozick is a resounding ‘yes’ because she was not involved in any decision-making regarding the initial production of the benefit and therefore is not contractually obliged to contribute to its continuance.​[48]​ Clearly, this objection causes a problem for those seeking to defend some notion of justice as reciprocity and is committed to individual choice-making. 

One response is not to deny the importance of Nozick’s objection, but instead to argue that, in practice, individual choice-making will become severely limited if interdependent and reciprocal relations are not first engaged in. It has been explored elsewhere how most individual choices (within modern industrial societies at least) can only be made given particular social, cultural and institutional contexts that are themselves based on more collective choices regarding how resources ought to be distributed.​[49]​ Policy development expresses this ‘collectivism’ as complex and over-lapping relationships explicitly set-up between the individual, groups, the state and various organisational and institutional forms. If these various contexts were themselves based on a collective choice that principles of reciprocity ought to be adhered to when distributing resources, then the range of choices made available will be limited, if the principle itself is undermined by those individuals who decide not to reciprocate. However, to re-emphasise Nozick’s point, the issue is not whether this latter type of decision-making is commendable given the above social contexts, but that it is nevertheless justifiable given that the non-reciprocator has not been party to these collective choices. My contention is that it can only be conceived of as justifiable if it is assumed that individuals are independent choosers.  If this assumption is not taken for granted then it is possible to mount a criticism of Nozick that does not necessarily undermine the value of individual choice-making but rather re-defines what it means to make a choice independently. 

For example, Gauthier (1990) by using ‘game-theory’ argues that if it is accepted that persons are ‘egoists’ (i.e. the objective of any person is to do as well for oneself as possible) co-operation with others based on a consented morality is still the best option to pursue for the individual.​[50]​ In relation to the arguments presented here, I might also argue that the mistake of the non-reciprocator (and of Nozick) is to assume that a particular choice is singularly independent of other choices. Given that individual choice-making is only made possible through co-operative and collective ventures and that this fact has moral implications, our choices might then more accurately be described as interdependent rather than independent.​[51]​ Once the non-reciprocator mistake is recognised, then justly deciding upon how one individual makes choices without reference to the way more collective choices are made seems more difficult to get off the ground. 


Fraternal commitment and the ‘celebration of difference’ – and some further policy implications

Finally, arguing that the necessity and interdependency of modern life requires us to take reciprocity seriously in relation to the value of choice-making, whilst may be persuasive for those who want to receive the benefits of modern life, will not persuade the few who are not committed in this way. It is to the latter group in particular that defending justice as reciprocity might require a more direct appeal to the reality of our human as well as social condition. Following from the above section I have argued for a conception of equality and citizenship that emphasises both the interdependent character of social relations and the fraternal nature of our engagement with others. Moreover, these engagements lead to obligations that can be underpinned by the principle of justice as reciprocity, but only on the assumption that this reciprocal fraternity will be promoted best through a whole-hearted commitment to what might be called ‘diversity in forms of life and living’. Of course, this then raises a very difficult set of questions in relation to how people might be motivated to learn from each other’s fates. I do not have any quick answers to this issue except that defending principles of justice have often not been made (at least in their entirety) based on appeals to human sentiment and inclination. In typical neo-Kantian style, it might be argued that it does not matter what people feel about principles of justice (in this case related to reciprocity) and consequently how people are motivated toward these principles, instead what matters is doing what is right. 

However, whilst this Kantian response is an answer up to a point, in that any government and the development of policy is dependent in part at least on a coercive state apparatus that forces at least some people to do what they are not motivated to do. It is too easy a response to what is an important objection to the political establishment of any principle of justice. Namely, that if people will not commit to it then this will lead to social and political instability that would likely undermine the possibilities of implementing such a principle. Moreover, this problem is a particularly difficult one for liberal egalitarians such as Rawls who depend for their neo-Kantian defence of justice on notions of ‘agreement’, ‘consensus and ‘contract’. One response to this difficulty would be to go (more or less) outside of what might be understood as the liberalism of Rawls and appeal directly to the way human beings communicate with each other. Habermas (1990), for example, uses the notion of ‘communicative action’ to depict how individuals are often motivated to find points of understanding through political dialogue which then provides a basis for agreement.​[52]​ On a different tack (i.e. working from very much within the tradition of Anglo-American political philosophy) but exploring similar problems, Cohen has recently argued that changing personal attitude and choice and what he calls ‘social ethos’ is essential when considering how justice is both conceptualised and implemented.​[53]​ 





“The difference principle … does seem to correspond to a natural meaning of fraternity: namely, to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit to others who are less well off.”​[54]​

However, according to my arguments above this is only half the story in relation to the Rawlsian injunction that we ought to share each other’s fate. In short, having disadvantages, whilst might signify limitations in a person’s life chances, do not signify limitations in a person’s life insights and personal skills. 

The notion of both learning and sharing from each other’s fate I believe underpins a more robust conception of fraternity than is often allowed. For example, it recognises the increased possibilities of reciprocity even when disadvantages are deeply and unfairly entrenched, and thereby gives fraternity an immediacy that is otherwise perhaps difficult to envisage. This in turn goes some way to addressing Scanlon’s concerns above (1998) that reciprocity is unable to guarantee predictability within social relations and therefore undermines the possibility of making long-term life-plans. To be sure certain forms of reciprocity cannot make assurances of this kind for the reasons that Scanlon highlights. However, if the principle of reciprocity is itself seen as a direct expression of a fraternal commitment to others based on mutual recognition and respect, then in practice the kinds of assurances that Scanlon is keen to safeguard will I believe be made. First, it offers additional reasons (other than the Rawlsian reasons above) for equally distributing life-chances. This re-distribution is on the grounds that the status of a reciprocating citizen can be established without waiting for various behavioural conditions to be fulfilled by the disadvantaged and before the rights of citizenship are conferred upon them. Second, conditions could be placed on the advantaged to learn from the disadvantaged but based on the further principle of mutual recognition and respect as derived from this learning process. It is the latter principle that provides an important focal point for addressing the motivational problems explored above, given that knowing/learning more about another person would by itself not be sufficient in producing either social co-operation or a guarantee against exploitation. A successful confidence trickster, for example, depends on a good knowledge-base to perform the trick but is self-evidently not exhibiting mutual recognition and respect for the person he is ‘conning’.​[55]​ Consequently, the rights of citizenship based on reciprocity and ‘fraternal learning’ are universally fulfilled in the context of promoting and encouraging mutual recognition and respect, being a central part of the learning process, and acting as a hallmark for might be understood as full-fledged fraternal relationship. 

Finally, the policy implications of the above may look similar to the Universal Basic Income (UBI) proposed by Van Der Veen (1998) and Van Parijs (1995; 1997) in that individual citizenship rights will be guaranteed by the income. However, it will be paid to fraternal citizens as contributors and not paid to free libertarians as individual choosers of life-styles. Nevertheless, in its practical application a ‘participation/citizen’s income’ of the kind I envisage will be distributed much more like UBI – i.e. as a universal benefit which is automatically paid unless there is good reason to withhold payment.​[56]​ In other words, welfare payments are paid in recognition that the disadvantaged have already something to contribute. 
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